Published
The Value of Uptake in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2024)
Arguments for what consent is often appeal to its functions. For instance, some argue that because consent functions to express the consent-giver’s autonomous control over her normative boundaries, consent must consist in a mental state. In this paper I argue that consent has an often overlooked function, and that its having this function has consequences for our views of what consent is. I argue that consent has a relationship-shaping function: acts of consent can alter and enable personal relationships. This function grounds an argument for the following claim: some acts of consent cannot be morally transformative unless there is uptake, or acceptance, or cooperation, on the recipient’s part. That is to say, at least some acts of consent need to be “cosigned” by both parties. This rules out what I call “unilateral” conceptions of consent, according to which consent can be given by the giver alone, and nobody else needs to enter the picture.
In progress & under review
Are There Any Imperfect Rights?
Sometimes a failure to do what is required by imperfect duty is not just wrong, but constitutes a wrong against a particular individual. Wrongs against particular others are often thought to involve the violation of the wronged party’s rights. But imperfect duties do not correlate with rights. How, then, can a failure to do one’s imperfect duty wrong a particular individual?
Wrongs without Rights? in Canadian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
There is a difference between doing something that is morally wrong, and wronging someone in particular. For example: Texting while driving is wrong, whereas injuring a pedestrian because you were texting while driving is a wrong against that particular pedestrian. It has been common to assume that wrongs just are violations of the victim’s rights, but recent arguments suggest otherwise: there are also wrongs without rights violations. If this is so, then what is it to wrong someone? In this paper I propose one answer to this question by identifying two relations of moral accountability that are present wherever wrongs occur. I suggest that to wrong someone just is to be liable for repairing one’s actions to someone—the victim of one’s wrong—whose will has a distinctive role in determining what one ought to do by way of moral repair.
Consent and Joint Decision — ISOS25 Handout
Consent is a normative power by which we can give other people permission to act in ways that would otherwise be off limits. There is ongoing philosophical debate surrounding what kinds of acts constitute consent, and why. With few exceptions, views in this literature identify consent as an act performed individually by the consent-giver. I argue that consent can also consist of a joint action performed by two or more parties: a joint decision made by two or more parties can constitute an exercise of consent. If, as I propose, joint decision can constitute consent, should say that to consent just is to make a joint decision of a certain kind? I will argue that such a view—a joint decision account of consent—can address two central theoretical challenges facing all theories of consent.
Revoking Consent — Handout
By giving consent, we can allow other people to act in ways that would otherwise be off limits to them. Sometimes, we can also take back the permissions we have generated by giving consent, or revoke prior consent. In this paper I am interested in understanding the power to revoke prior consent in more detail. Specifically, I want to ask whether it is always in our power to revoke our prior consent; and if it is not, what limits there are on the power to revoke prior consent.
A Puzzle About Sexual Promises
This paper discusses a problem for promises regarding sexual contact. In a nutshell, the problem is that promises obligate, but an obligation to partake in sexual contact with someone is in tension with the idea that we have a right to refuse such contact. If sexual promises obligate, what gives? I argue that unlike most other promises, sexual promises leave open the option of refusing to act as promised without wrongdoing because the right to refuse sexual contact is an unwaivable right.
Staying Private and Being Forgotten
A paper on privacy and its relation to the right to be forgotten.
Other work in early stages of development
A paper on the enforceability of rights.
A paper on waiving privacy-rights.
A paper on shared practical reasons (reasons-for-us).
A paper on whether joint action with artificial agents is possible.