Publications

The Value of Uptake in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2024)

Arguments for what consent is often appeal to its functions. For instance, some argue that because consent functions to express the consent-giver’s autonomous control over her normative boundaries, consent must consist in a mental state. In this paper I argue that consent has an often overlooked function, and that its having this function has consequences for our views of what consent is. I argue that consent has a relationship-shaping function: acts of consent can alter and enable personal relationships. This function grounds an argument for the following claim: some acts of consent cannot be morally transformative unless there is uptake, or acceptance, or cooperation, on the recipient’s part. That is to say, at least some acts of consent need to be “cosigned” by both parties. This rules out what I call “unilateral” conceptions of consent, according to which consent can be given by the giver alone, and nobody else needs to enter the picture.

In progress & under review

Are There Any Imperfect Rights?

Sometimes a failure to do what is required by imperfect duty is not just wrong, but constitutes a wrong against a particular individual. Wrongs against particular others are often thought to involve the violation of the wronged party’s rights. But imperfect duties do not correlate with rights. How, then, can a failure to do one’s imperfect duty wrong a particular individual?

Wrongs without Rights? in Canadian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)

There is a difference between doing something that is wrong and wronging someone in particular. Texting while driving is wrong; injuring a pedestrian because you were texting while driving is a wrong against that particular pedestrian. It has been common to think that wrongs just are violations of the wronged party’s rights, but recent arguments suggest otherwise: there can also be wrongs without rights violations. Supposing these arguments are correct, what is it to wrong someone?

Consent and Joint Decision — ISOS25 Handout

Consent is a normative power by which we can give other people permission to act in ways that would otherwise be off limits. There is ongoing philosophical debate surrounding what kinds of acts constitute consent, and why. With few exceptions, views in this literature identify consent as an act performed individually by the consent-giver. I argue that consent can also consist of a joint action performed by two or more parties: a joint decision made by two or more parties can constitute an exercise of consent. If, as I propose, joint decision can constitute consent, should say that to consent just is to make a joint decision of a certain kind? I will argue that such a view—a joint decision account of consent—can address two central theoretical challenges facing all theories of consent. 

Revoking Consent

What explains why certain kinds of consent are always revokable, and others can be irrevocable? I consider two possible views of revoking: one that highlights the connection that consent has to autonomy, and one that highlights an additional connection between consent and bodily integrity. I argue that both of these views of revoking run into problems. I propose a third view which highlights the connection that consent has to interpersonal justifiability. I argue that this view can avoid the problems that arise for the other views, and it can explain the difference between revocable and irrevocable consent.

A Puzzle About Sexual Promises

This paper discusses a problem for promises regarding sexual contact. In a nutshell, the problem is that promises obligate, but an obligation to partake in sexual contact with someone is in tension with the idea that we have a right to refuse such contact. If sexual promises obligate, what gives? I argue that unlike most other promises, sexual promises leave open the option of refusing to act as promised without wrongdoing because the right to refuse sexual contact is an unwaivable right. 

Staying Private and Being Forgotten

A right to be forgotten, sometimes known as a right to erasure, is a right to have information about oneself erased or removed at one’s request. According to a popular view reflected in legal cases involving the right to be forgotten, the moral basis of this right is privacy. In “The Right to Be Forgotten and the Value of an Open Future” Lowry Pressly argues against that popular view and proposes an alternative: according to Pressly, the right to be forgotten has its moral basis in our need for “agentive confidence”. I argue that Pressly’s objections to the popular view can be overcome. The popular view also has advantages over Pressly’s proposed alternative, and can accommodate its main insight, which is that the possibility of an “open future” is a valuable thing that merits being protected by right. 

Other work in early stages of development

  • Rights & Reciprocity — A paper on the enforceability of rights.

  • Privacy & Permission — A paper on waiving privacy-rights.

  • A paper on shared practical reasons (reasons-for-us).

  • A paper on whether joint action with artificial agents is possible.