Published

The Value of Uptake in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2024)

Arguments for what consent is often appeal to its functions. For instance, some argue that because consent functions to express the consent-giver’s autonomous control over her normative boundaries, consent must consist in a mental state. In this paper I argue that consent has an often overlooked function, and that its having this function has consequences for our views of what consent is. I argue that consent has a relationship-shaping function: acts of consent can alter and enable personal relationships. This function grounds an argument for the following claim: some acts of consent cannot be morally transformative unless there is uptake, or acceptance, or cooperation, on the recipient’s part. That is to say, at least some acts of consent need to be “cosigned” by both parties. This rules out what I call “unilateral” conceptions of consent, according to which consent can be given by the giver alone, and nobody else needs to enter the picture.

In progress & under review

Are There Any Imperfect Rights?

Sometimes a failure to do what is required by imperfect duty is not just wrong, but constitutes a wrong against a particular individual. Wrongs against particular others are often thought to involve the violation of the wronged party’s rights. But imperfect duties do not correlate with rights. How, then, can a failure to do one’s imperfect duty wrong a particular individual?

Wrongs without Rights? in Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2026)

There is a difference between doing something that is wrong and wronging someone in particular. Texting while driving is wrong; injuring a pedestrian because you were texting while driving is a wrong against that particular pedestrian. It has been common to think that wrongs just are violations of the wronged party’s rights, but recent arguments suggest otherwise: there can also be wrongs without rights violations. Supposing these arguments are correct, what is it to wrong someone?

Consenting Together

Consent is a normative power by which we can give other people permission to act in ways that would otherwise be off limits. There is ongoing philosophical debate surrounding what kinds of acts constitute consent, and why. With few exceptions, views in this literature identify consent as an act performed individually by the consent-giver. I argue that consent can also consist of a joint action performed by two or more parties: a joint decision made by two or more parties can constitute an exercise of consent. If, as I propose, joint decision can constitute consent, should say that to consent just is to make a joint decision of a certain kind? I will argue that such a view—a joint decision account of consent—can address two central theoretical challenges facing all theories of consent. 

Cancelling Consent

By giving consent, we can permit others to act in ways that would otherwise be wrong. We can cancel such permissions by revoking our prior consent. Discussions of bodily consent often emphasise the fact that such consent is revocable, and is always permissible to revoke. But consent in other domains can be irrevocable, and impermissible to revoke. This paper considers three possible accounts of the power to revoke consent, and defends a view of revoking that highlights consent’s connection to interpersonal justifiability. 

A Puzzle About Sexual Promises

This paper discusses a problem for promises regarding sexual contact. In a nutshell, the problem is that promises obligate, but an obligation to partake in sexual contact with someone is in tension with the idea that we have a right to refuse such contact. If sexual promises obligate, what gives? I argue that unlike most other promises, sexual promises leave open the option of refusing to act as promised without wrongdoing because the right to refuse sexual contact is an unwaivable right. 

Staying Private and Being Forgotten in Ethics (forthcoming)

It is widely agreed that individuals have a right to “be forgotten” on the internet. According to a popular view, the right has its moral basis in privacy. Lowry Pressly argues against this view. I argue that Pressly’s arguments have no bite against the popular view. They do speak against certain long standing ideas about the right to privacy. But this is a problem for those ideas about the right to privacy—not for the idea that the right to be forgotten has its moral basis in privacy.

In early stages of development

  • Rights & Reciprocity — A paper on the enforceability of rights.

  • Privacy & Permission — A paper on waiving privacy-rights.

  • Parasocial Partiality — A paper on parasocial relationships.

  • A paper on the content of privacy rights.

  • A paper on digital consent.