Publications

The Value of Uptake in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2024)

Arguments for what consent is often appeal to its functions. For instance, some argue that because consent functions to express the consent-giver’s autonomous control over her normative boundaries, consent must consist in a mental state. In this paper I argue that consent has an often overlooked function, and that its having this function has consequences for our views of what consent is. I argue that consent has a relationship-shaping function: acts of consent can alter and enable personal relationships. This function grounds an argument for the following claim: some acts of consent cannot be morally transformative unless there is uptake, or acceptance, or cooperation, on the recipient’s part. That is to say, at least some acts of consent need to be “cosigned” by both parties. This rules out what I call “unilateral” conceptions of consent, according to which consent can be given by the giver alone, and nobody else needs to enter the picture.

Work in progress & under review

Are There Any Imperfect Rights?

It is common to think of our duty to promote the good of others—the duty of beneficence—as an imperfect duty. Friends of this common view face the problem of “obligatory aid”: intuitively, morality sometimes requires us to promote another’s good, and does not merely recommend it; this is in tension with the idea that we have latitude to choose whom, when, and how we benefit. In this paper I pose, and propose a solution to, an additional problem that arises from similar intuitions. Intuitively, we can sometimes wrong others by failing to do our imperfect duty; for example an ungrateful beneficiary is not guilty of mere wrongdoing, but of wronging their benefactor in particular. If imperfect duties do not correspond to rights, what explains the possibility of such wrongs?

Wrongs without Rights?

There is a difference between doing something that is morally wrong, and wronging someone in particular. For example: Texting while driving is wrong, whereas injuring a pedestrian because you were texting while driving is a wrong against that particular pedestrian. It has been common to assume that wrongs just are violations of the victim’s rights, but recent arguments suggest otherwise: there are also wrongs without rights violations. If this is so, then what is it to wrong someone? In this paper I propose one answer to this question by identifying two relations of moral accountability that are present wherever wrongs occur. I suggest that to wrong someone just is to be liable for repairing one’s actions to someone—the victim of one’s wrong—whose will has a distinctive role in determining what one ought to do by way of  moral repair.

Consent and Joint Decision — ISOS25 Handout

Consent is a normative power by which we can give other people permission to act in ways that would otherwise be off limits. There is ongoing philosophical debate surrounding what kinds of acts constitute consent, and why. With few exceptions, views in this literature identify consent as an act performed individually by the consent-giver. I argue that consent can also consist of a joint action performed by two or more parties: a joint decision made by two or more parties can constitute an exercise of consent. If, as I propose, joint decision can constitute consent, should say that to consent just is to make a joint decision of a certain kind? I will argue that such a view—a joint decision account of consent—can address two central theoretical challenges facing all theories of consent. 

Revoking Consent

By giving consent, we can allow other people to act in ways that would otherwise be off limits to them. Sometimes, we can also take back the permissions we have generated by giving consent, or revoke prior consent. In this paper I am interested in understanding the power to revoke prior consent in more detail. Specifically, I want to ask whether it is always in our power to revoke our prior consent; and if it is not, what limits there are on the power to revoke prior consent.

A Puzzle About Sexual Promises

This paper poses a puzzle for promises regarding sexual contact. In a nutshell, the puzzle is that promises are standardly thought to make the promised action obligatory for the promisor; but an obligation to participate in sexual activity seems to be in conflict with a fixed point of common sense sexual ethics: it’s never wrong for a person to refuse to engage in sexual activity. If we can make promises to participate in sexual activities, what gives? I argue that the puzzle can be solved by taking a closer look at our right to refuse sexual contact. I argue that, given the function of this right, a promise to perform any action that is protected by it can be refused by the promisor without wrongdoing. 

The Discontents of Mobile Consent

In recent years, many jurisdictions have adopted affirmative consent as the legal standard for sexual encounters. In response, software developers have introduced mobile consent applications that are designed to document affirmative consent to sex. These applications purport to set up legal and moral safeguards against consent violations. In this paper I argue that these applications fail to do so, because they fail to facilitate valid consent to sex. Sexual consent is an ongoing process that requires mutual attention, responsiveness, and interaction between partners. These aspects of valid consent cannot be facilitated, nor are they documented by, a one-off digital agreement.

Other work in early stages of development

  • A paper on whether rights are (always) enforceable.

  • A paper on shared practical reasons (reasons-for-us).

  • A paper on whether joint action with artificial agents is possible.